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This paper uses data on house transactions in the state of Massachusetts over the last 20 years to show
that houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy of at least one seller,
are sold at lower prices than other houses. Foreclosure discounts are particularly large on average at
28% of the value of a house. The pattern of death-related discounts suggests that they may result from
poor home maintenance by older sellers, while foreclosure discounts appear to be related to the threat
of vandalism in low-priced neighborhoods. After aggregating to the zipcode level and controlling for
regional price trends, the prices of forced sales are mean-reverting, while the prices of unforced sales
are close to a random walk. At the zipcode level, this suggests that unforced sales take place at approximately
efficient prices, while forced-sales prices reflect time-varying illiquidity in neighborhood housing
markets. At a more local level, however, we find that foreclosures that take place within a quarter
of a mile, and particularly within a tenth of a mile, of a house lower the price at which it is sold. Our
preferred estimate of this effect is that a foreclosure at a distance of 0.05 miles lowers the price of
a house by about 1%.
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The market for housing di⁄ers in several important ways from the textbook model
of a liquid asset market with exogenous fundamentals. This implies that the price
at which a house is sold can be in￿ uenced not only by general supply and demand
conditions, but also by idiosyncratic factors including the urgency of the sale and the
e⁄ects of the ownership transfer on the physical quality of the house.
First, houses are productive only when people are living in them. Owning an
empty house is equivalent to throwing away the dividend on a ￿nancial asset. Sec-
ond, houses are fragile assets that need maintenance, and are vulnerable to vandal-
ism. Unoccupied houses are particularly vulnerable and expensive to protect. Third,
short-term rental contracts involve high transactions costs, resulting from the mov-
ing costs of renters and the need of homeowners to protect their property against
damage. Fourth, houses are expensive, indivisible, and heterogeneous assets. Each
house has certain unique characteristics which are likely to appeal to certain potential
buyers and not to others, so selling a house requires matching it with an appropriate
buyer. Because of the high costs of intermediation in housing, this task is normally
undertaken by a real estate broker rather than a dealer. Fifth, most homeown-
ers must ￿nance their purchases using mortgages, collateralized debt contracts that
transfer home ownership to the mortgage lender through a foreclosure process if the
homeowner defaults.
The expansion of mortgage credit earlier this decade and the recent decline in
house prices have led to an unprecedented increase in foreclosures since 2006. Fore-
closures transfer houses to ￿nancial institutions who must maintain and protect them
until they can be sold. Foreclosed houses are likely to sell at low prices, both because
they may have been physically damaged during the foreclosure process, and because
￿nancial institutions have an incentive to sell them quickly. In a liquid market, an
asset can be sold rapidly with a minimal impact on its price, but the characteristics of
housing discussed above make the market for residential real estate a classic example
of an illiquid market, in which urgent sales lower prices.2
There is widespread concern that foreclosures may also lower the prices of nearby
houses, either through direct physical e⁄ects on neighborhoods or by creating an
2Mayer (1995) presents a theoretical model of this e⁄ect, assuming that an urgent sale is imple-
mented using an auction.
1imbalance of demand and supply in an illiquid neighborhood housing market. If
such spillover e⁄ects on prices are important, they might stimulate further foreclosures
because homeowners are more likely to default when their houses are worth less than
the face value of their mortgages. See for example the motivation for the Obama
Administration￿ s Making Home A⁄ordable plan, as described on the US Treasury
website: ￿In the absence of decisive action, we risk an intensifying spiral in which
lenders foreclose, pushing area home prices still lower, reducing the value of household
savings, and making it harder for all families to re￿nance. In some studies, foreclosure
on a home has been found to reduce the prices of nearby homes by as much as 9%.￿
(US Treasury 2009.)
In this paper we seek to understand the illiquidity of the housing market, and
speci￿cally the e⁄ects of foreclosures on the prices of foreclosed houses and other
houses in the same neighborhood. We use a comprehensive dataset on individual
house transactions in Massachusetts over the period from 1987 through the ￿rst quar-
ter of 2008. Importantly, Massachusetts experienced a signi￿cant decline in house
prices and wave of foreclosures during the early 1990￿ s, which gives us a historical
precedent that can be used to shed light on the current condition of the housing
market.
We study several categories of sales which plausibly are more urgent than normal.
We ￿rst link data on house transactions in the state of Massachusetts, over the period
1987 to March 2008, to information on deaths and bankruptcies of individuals. By
matching names and addresses across datasets, we are able to identify transactions
as forced sales if they occur close in time to the death or bankruptcy of at least one
seller. We use hedonic regressions with neighborhood ￿xed e⁄ects, standard in the
real estate literature, to control for heterogeneity in the characteristics of houses. We
￿nd that forced sales take place at price discounts of about 3-7%, and these discounts
increase when a house has one seller rather than two.
One concern about this ￿nding is that it might re￿ ect unobserved e⁄ects of death
or bankruptcy on the quality of a house, in particular deferred maintenance by home-
owners with health or ￿nancial problems. In order to explore this issue, we examine
how discounts vary with the timing of sales in relation to the seller￿ s death or bank-
ruptcy, we separate the deaths of younger and older sellers, we distinguish housing
types, and we relate discounts to the various components of a property￿ s value. We
￿nd that death-related discounts are not closely related to the timing of a sale in
relation to death, are larger for older sellers, smaller for condominiums, and larger for
2houses whose structures account for a larger fraction of their value. This evidence
suggests that death-related discounts re￿ ect poor maintenance of houses by older sell-
ers, while bankruptcy-related discounts appear more closely related to the urgency of
sale immediately after bankruptcy.
Our main interest is in foreclosures. We ￿nd large foreclosure discounts, about
28% on average. These discounts are not highly sensitive to the type of housing,
but they are larger for houses with low-priced characteristics in low-priced neighbor-
hoods. This suggests that the foreclosure discount is related to vandalism, through
two possible channels. First, foreclosed houses may have been damaged before they
can be sold. Second, mortgage lenders must protect foreclosed houses while they are
vacant; the threat of vandalism may be greater in bad neighborhoods, and costs of
protection likely account for a larger fraction of the value of a low-priced house. The
costs of protection induce mortage lenders to sell foreclosed houses urgently, leading
to discounts in illiquid housing markets.
The incidence of foreclosure sales is highly variable over time and space, but in
some areas at some times foreclosures account for a large fraction of total sales.
This allows us to study the relations between forced sales prices and the subsequent
transactions prices of other houses in the same neighborhood.
We contrast two extreme views of the relation between forced and unforced sales
prices for houses. The ￿rst view is that unforced transactions take place at e¢ cient
prices, which evolve following a random walk, while forced sales take place at lower
prices. If the housing market were a dealer market with a bid-ask spread, we could
think of unforced transactions as revealing the e¢ cient price at the midpoint of the
spread, while forced transactions reveal the lower bid price. If the bid-ask spread is
variable over time, then large discounts of forced from unforced sales prices should
predict increases in forced sales prices, but should have no implications for future
prices of unforced transactions. That is, bid-ask bounce (Roll 1984) a⁄ects the
prices of forced sales but not those of unforced sales.
The opposite extreme view is that forced sales convey information about the future
prices of unforced transactions. There are several reasons why this might be the
case. First, forced sales may perform the function of price discovery, revealing the
prices at which buyers are willing to enter the market. Particularly in down markets,
homeowners without urgent motives to sell may set unrealistically high prices, perhaps
because their expectations lag the market or because they use their purchase price as
a reference price (Genesove and Mayer 2001). In this situation, unforced transactions
3may take place only when particularly enthusiastic buyers appear. If the housing
market had a bid-ask spread, we could think of forced transactions as revealing the
e¢ cient price at the midpoint of the spread, while unforced transactions reveal the
higher ask price. If the bid-ask spread varies over time, a large discount of forced
from unforced prices would predict declines in unforced sales prices.
There could also be causal e⁄ects of forced sales on the general level of house
prices. Forced sales could absorb demand, reducing the prices of those houses that
come to market later. Forced sales could a⁄ect the reference prices that buyers and
sellers use as ￿comparables￿when they negotiate prices. In the case of foreclosures,
there is widespread concern that there may be direct negative e⁄ects of foreclosures
on neighborhoods. Foreclosures typically involve periods during which houses stand
empty, reducing the visual appeal and social cohesion of the neighborhood and en-
couraging crime (Apgar, Duda, and Gorey 2005, Immergluck and Smith 2005, 2006).
Despite the plausibility of these concerns, we ￿nd that at the zipcode level, the
prices of forced sales have relatively little predictive power for the prices of other
transactions in the housing market. The discount between urgent sales prices and
other sales prices is stationary, so when it widens, it normally narrows again. But
this primarily occurs through an increase in the prices of forced sales, not through a
decrease in the prices at which other transactions occur.
In order to detect spillover e⁄ects from forced sales to unforced sales, we look at
foreclosures that take place within a quarter of a mile, and within a tenth of a mile,
of each transaction in our dataset. At this highly local level, we do see evidence
that foreclosures lower house prices, and the e⁄ect is economically signi￿cant during
foreclosure waves. The extremely localized nature of these spillover e⁄ects is consis-
tent with results reported by Harding, Rosenblatt, and Yao (2008) for foreclosures,
and by Rossi-Hansberg, Sarte, and Owens (2008) for urban revitalization expendi-
tures. The spillover e⁄ects of foreclosures are persistent and, like the discounts on
foreclosed houses, they are larger in low-priced neighborhoods. Both results suggest
that spillovers may re￿ ect physical damage to neighborhoods.
The forced sale discounts we report in this paper are consistent with earlier ￿ndings
of illiquidity in the housing market. There is evidence that certain seller characteris-
tics in￿ uence selling price and time on the market in opposite directions, as would be
expected if an urgent desire to sell lowers the price that a house fetches. Genesove
and Mayer (1997) show that homeowners with larger mortgages relative to their home
values set higher asking prices, realize higher prices if they sell, but keep their homes
4on the market longer than homeowners with smaller mortgages. More precisely, they
￿nd that a house with a loan-to-value ratio of 100% sells for 4% more but stays on
the market 15% longer than a house with a loan-to-value ratio of 80%. Levitt and
Syverson (2008) show that realtors selling their own houses get higher prices and keep
their homes on the market longer than their clients do. The price di⁄erential is about
4%, and the time on the market di⁄erential is about 10%, numbers which are roughly
comparable to those reported by Genesove and Mayer. Mayer (1998) studies real
estate auctions, which in the United States have been used primarily as a rapid sales
mechanism by developers and banks, and ￿nds discounts of up to 9% in Los Angeles
during a real estate boom, and between 9% and 21% in Dallas during a real estate
bust.
A related literature in corporate ￿nance argues that assets with limited alternative
uses appeal to relatively few buyers and are correspondingly less valuable when they
must be urgently sold. This a⁄ects the debt contracts that can be used to ￿nance
such assets (Shleifer and Vishny 1992). Benmelech, Garmaise, and Moskowitz (2005)
apply this insight to commercial real estate.
The organization of the paper is as follows. Section 2 describes our data and
the procedures we have used to clean it. Section 3 presents our hedonic regression
methodology and uses it to estimate the discounts of forced sales from unforced sales.
This section also uses cross-sectional variation in discounts to distinguish alternative
interpretations. Section 4 studies the ability of forced and unforced sales prices to
predict future changes in house prices within the same zip codes, and more local
spillover e⁄ects from foreclosures to house prices in the immediate neighborhood.
Section 5 concludes.
2 House Price and Forced Sale Data
2.1 House prices
We begin with a dataset on changes in ownership of residential real estate, provided
to us by the Warren Group. The data cover the period 1987 to March 2008, and are
the entire state of Massachusetts. Figure 1, which shows the number of transactions
by zip code, illustrates the geographical coverage of the data.
5The Warren Group data record basic characteristics of the houses involved in each
transaction. In almost all cases, the characteristics are measured as of August 2007;
about 30,000 houses were added to the dataset after this date and have characteristics
measured later. Unfortunately, we do not have a dynamic dataset tracking changes
in house characteristics over time.
The Warren Group data also record the sales price of each house and the names
of buyers and sellers. We have carefully cleaned the data to remove transactions that
appear to be intra-family transfers of ownership rather than arms-length transactions,
and duplicate transactions that re￿ ect intermediation or corrections of public records.
The online appendix to this paper (Campbell, Giglio, and Pathak 2009) describes our
data cleaning procedures in detail.
We remove outliers from the Warren Group data in several steps. We exclude
transactions in properties that cannot be classi￿ed as either single family, multifamily,
or condominiums, and transactions that take place at extreme prices, below the 1st
or above the 99th percentile of the distribution of raw prices. Where the dataset
reports impossible property characteristics (for example, zero rooms), we treat these
characteristics as missing. Finally, we winsorize reported square footage at the 1st
and 99th percentiles and reported numbers of rooms at the 99th percentile.
The top panel of Table 1 reports summary statistics for the resulting dataset of
1,783,360 transactions. The median house, across all houses in all years, has 1,535
square feet of living area on a 9,452 square foot lot; it is 38 years old with 6 rooms, 3
bedrooms, and 2.0 bathrooms, and sells for a nominal price of $175,800. The means
of these characteristics are slightly higher than the medians, indicating right skewness
of the distribution, for all these characteristics except age.
In the bottom panel of Table 1 we match addresses to census tracts, and associate
each house with the characteristics of its tract, as measured in the 2000 census. Then
we report the distribution of these neighborhood characteristics across the transac-
tions in our database. The median house is in a census tract with a median income
of more than $55,000, with a population that is 2% Hispanic, 1% African-American,
24% under age 18, 13% over age 65, 4% in female-headed households, 20% with a
college degree, 11% with a graduate degree, and 10% with no high school degree.
However, these characteristics vary widely across neighborhoods.
62.2 Forced sales
In order to identify forced sales, we obtain data on deaths and bankruptcy ￿lings
from the Death Master File of the Social Security Administration and Lexis/Nexis,
respectively. These data give us names, addresses, and dates which can be matched
to the names and addresses of house sellers in the Warren Group data. Many houses
have two joint sellers, and we classify the sale as forced if we can match the name
of at least one of these sellers to a death or bankruptcy ￿ling within three years of
the house sale. The Death Master File also gives us the ages of sellers, information
that is not available elsewhere in our dataset. Although our bankruptcy data include
some corporate bankruptcy ￿lings, only personal bankruptcies end up matched to
house sales.
The algorithm we use for name matching is described in detail in the online
appendix. We match based on last name, ￿rst name, and zip code. We then
use sensible priority rules, based on match quality, middle initials, and event dates,
to eliminate multiple matches.
We also identify forced sales related to foreclosures. Foreclosure proceedings typi-
cally begin after homeowners miss about three payments and are unable to negotiate
a solution with their lenders. During this period, homeowners may be able to sell their
property prior to actual foreclosure, but our data do not allow us to identify these
cases. The Warren Group data report transfers of ownership that take place only
through foreclosure by demarcating the source of the transaction deed as foreclosure-
related.
Massachusetts has both judicial and non-judicial foreclosures. A judicial foreclo-
sure is processed through the courts, beginning with lender ￿ling and recording a
notice which includes the amount of outstanding debt and reasons for foreclosure.
Non-judicial foreclosures, in contrast, are processed without court intervention, and
the foreclosure requirements are established by state statutes. In either case, with
assistance from the local sheri⁄￿ s o¢ ce, the ￿rst attempt at selling the property is
via an auction. The trustee or attorney handling the foreclosure sets the opening bid
and this is usually advertised in the foreclosure notice. The typical opening bid is
the balance of the mortgage plus penalties, unpaid interest, attorney fees, and other
costs that the lender has incurred during the process. In Massachusetts, the deposit
to participate in the auction is usually $5,000 and homeowners are not obligated to
allow bidders to investigate inside the property. The main item actually auctioned
7is the ￿rst mortgage, or senior lien, which gives the buyer the most control over the
property.3
The property either is sold to the highest bidder or is turned over to a trustee to
liquidate the property and pay the lender, or the auction is unsuccessful. Since Massa-
chusetts does not have a redemption period where a homeowner retains the right to
buy back the property by paying the full amount of the loan along with taxes, inter-
est, and penalties, the transfer of ownership becomes complete at a closing following
the foreclosure auction. The previous owners, if still present, are automatically con-
verted to tenants, and the new owner must follow Massachusetts legal procedures for
eviction.4 Successful auctions represent 18% of our cases. We identify these as cases
where the acquirer is an individual or realty trust, or takes out a mortgage to ￿nance
the purchase.
If nobody bids higher than the opening bid, control is handled over to the lender.
In this case, the lender is responsible for the sale of the property, and usually trans-
fers the property to its real estate owned (REO) department, which prepares it for
sale typically on the open market. Occasionally, REOs negotiate sales directly with
investors rather than place the property on the market, and can even o⁄er purchasers
packages of properties. For these 82% of cases in our dataset, we treat the subsequent
sale of the property by the mortgage lender as an urgent or forced sale.
In cases where a sale is both foreclosure-related and linked to a death or bank-
ruptcy, we retain the foreclosure classi￿cation. If a sale is linked to both a death
and a bankruptcy, we use priority rules, based on match quality and event dates, to
classify it as either death-related or bankruptcy-related.
The top panel of Table 2 reports the frequency of each type of forced sale for
each year in our data set. The ￿rst column of the table shows the total number
of housing transactions in the Warren Group data in each year. We have just over
22 years of data and a total of 1,783,360 transactions, for an average of just over
81,000 transactions per year. Of these, 5.6% are forced transactions: 3.1% related
3According to Massachusetts law, if the ￿rst mortgage forces the foreclosure, and there is no
money left after the sale of the house to pay the second mortgage, the lender of the second mortgage
still has a claim against the borrower, but cannot take the house anymore. However, if it is the
second lender who is forcing the foreclosure, the property will be sold with a lien from the ￿rst
mortgage.
4This can run anywhere from 6 weeks to 6 months, with the average about 10 weeks
(http://www.lawlib.state.ma.us/foreclosure.html, ￿Foreclosure FAQ￿ ).
8to foreclosures, 1.7% related to deaths, and 0.8% related to bankruptcies. The
fraction of forced sales is highly variable over time. At the very end of the sample
this is due to the fact that we cannot match sales to future deaths or bankruptcies.
More generally, it re￿ ects a gradual increase in death-related sales over time, and an
upward shift in the incidence of bankruptcy in the late 1990s and early 2000s before
bankruptcy reform increased the cost of personal bankruptcy in 2005.5 However
the most important time-variation is driven by two waves of foreclosures during the
housing downturns of the early 1990s and 2007-08. The incidence of foreclosure-
related forced sales was negligible in 1987, rose to 9.7% in 1993, then receded to
under 1% in the mid-2000￿ s before rising again to reach a record level of 12.7% in the
￿rst quarter of 2008.
The bottom panel of Table 2 categorizes forced sales according to the date of the
death, bankruptcy, or foreclosure in relation to the house sale. In the case of death,
we ￿nd that house sales within one year of the death of a seller are more common than
house sales two or three years before or after the death of a seller; however sales are
almost equally common the year before a seller￿ s death and the year after. In the case
of bankruptcy, we ￿nd that house sales are relatively rare during the three years before
a bankruptcy ￿ling, but the sales incidence spikes up the year after the ￿ling and then
gradually declines. The scarcity of sales before bankruptcy presumably re￿ ects the
fact that bankruptcy ￿ling protects all but the most expensive primary residences
from creditors through the homestead exemption (White 2008). Foreclosure-related
sales cannot occur before the underlying foreclosure, and tend to take place rapidly
thereafter. Of the 3.1% of foreclosure-related sales in our dataset, 2.6% occur within
one year, 0.3% in the second year, 0.1% in the third year, and the remainder with a
longer lag.
Table 3 shows how our transactions are divided among single family houses, mul-
tifamily houses, and condominiums, and what fraction of them take place in the city
of Boston as opposed to the rest of the state. We ￿nd that in the complete dataset,
64% of transactions are in single family houses, 11% in multifamily houses, and 25%
in condominiums. Among forced sales, however, multifamily houses are more com-
mon (20%) and condominiums are less common (18%). The paper reports results
both for the entire dataset, and for separate subsamples for each housing type.
5Morgan, Iverson, and Botsch (2008) suggest that the bankruptcy reform of 2005 contributed to
the subsequent increase in subprime mortgage defaults by making it harder for borrowers to achieve
relief from unsecured debt obligations.
9The city of Boston accounts for 8% of all sales and almost 10% of forced sales.
Boston￿ s modestly greater share of forced sales is entirely caused by a higher incidence
of foreclosures in Boston (13% of foreclosures are in the city). Death- and bankruptcy-
related sales are actually less common in Boston than elsewhere. Figure 2 gives a
richer picture of the geographic distribution of forced sales, plotting by zip code the
share of forced sales in total sales. The paper reports an analysis of the entire dataset,
but we have veri￿ed that the results are qualitatively similar when we run separate
analyses for eastern and western Massachusetts.
Table 4 summarizes the distribution of house characteristics for forced sales. The
top panel of the table has exactly the same format as Table 1, and the bottom panel
reports the ratio of each number in the top panel to the corresponding number in
Table 1. The median forced sale takes place at a price of $116,000, only two thirds
of the median sales price reported in Table 1. This is true despite the fact that the
median forced sale is of a similarly sized house on a lot 80% of the size of the median
sale.
At ￿rst sight, the lower median price for forced sales suggests that these transac-
tions take place at a large price discount. However, one cannot reach this conclusion
on the basis of Table 4 alone. The incidence of forced sales was much greater in the
early 1990￿ s, when the overall level of prices was depressed; and forced sales are more
likely to take place in low-income minority neighborhoods, where prices are likely to
be lower for any given size of house. The next step in our analysis is to control for
these e⁄ects by using a hedonic regression.
3 The Forced Sale Discount
3.1 Static hedonic regression
Hedonic regression is a standard approach for estimating the relationship between
the prices of houses and their characteristics. Tables 5 and 6 report the results of
regressing the log of each transactions price onto control variables for the overall level
of local prices, the e⁄ects of measured house characteristics, and dummies indicating
forced sales. We include a separate dummy for each zipcode-year, thus controlling
for all house price variation over time at the zipcode level. We also include a rich set
10of house characteristics including interior area, lot area, numbers of rooms, bedrooms,
and bathrooms, the age of the house and its square, recent renovation, a dummy for
condominiums, and dummies for winsorization of these characteristics. To control
for neighborhood characteristics within zipcodes, we include data on the census tracts
where each house is located, including median income and the population shares of
Hispanics, African-Americans, minors, seniors, female-headed households, and groups
with di⁄erent levels of education. The coe¢ cients on these control variables, reported
in Table 5, have the expected signs and plausible magnitudes. Further controls, not
reported in Table 5, include dummy variables for the type of heating and style of
house. The entire list of controls is presented in the Appendix.
Table 6 reports the coe¢ cients on our forced sale dummies. The ￿rst column
reports results for our full sample including all housing types. When we use a single
dummy for all categories of forced sales, we ￿nd a large and precisely estimated
coe¢ cient of -0.199, corresponding to a price discount of 1 ￿ exp(￿0:199) = 18%:
This e⁄ect is primarily driven by foreclosure-related sales. When we include sep-
arate dummies for death-related sales by young (under age 70) and old (age 70 or
above) sellers, bankruptcy-related sales, and foreclosure-related sales, we ￿nd coe¢ -
cients of -0.051, -0.068, -0.032, and -0.323, respectively. The coe¢ cient for foreclosure
implies a large price discount of 28%.
In Table 7 we look separately at houses with a single seller and with two sellers.
Again, the ￿rst column reports results for all housing types. We ￿nd a much larger
discount for death-related sales when the house has a single seller than when it has
two sellers. In the former case the discount coe¢ cients are -0.082 and -0.095 for
young and old sellers respectively, while in the latter case they are -0.035 and -0.053.
We also ￿nd a considerably larger discount for bankruptcy-related sales when there
is only one seller (-0.061) than when there are two (-0.014).
3.2 Interpreting the forced sale discount
A key challenge is to understand whether lower prices for forced sales re￿ ect illiquid-
ity in the housing market, or unobserved variation in fundamental characteristics of
houses. For example, deaths are more common among older sellers, whose houses
may be poorly maintained or unfashionably decorated. The fact that the death-
related discount is increasing in the age of the seller suggests the relevance of this
11point. Sellers in ￿nancial di¢ culty may also fail to maintain their houses properly,
and houses that have been foreclosed may have been vandalized while standing empty,
or even in some cases vandalized by their former owners.
To shed some light on this issue, we explore how the forced sale discount varies
with the timing of a sale in relation to death or bankruptcy, across housing types,
and across houses whose value is concentrated in the structure or the land.
Figure 3 shows that discounts for death-related sales are relatively insensitive to
the timing of the death, from 3 years before to 2 years after the sale. In fact, when
we include dummies for deaths more than three years before or after the sale (which
would not be classi￿ed as forced sales), we ￿nd that these also enter the regression
signi￿cantly. This con￿rms the suspicion that the estimated price e⁄ect is not directly
related to the urgency of the sale, but results from unobserved poor maintenance.
The timing pattern for bankruptcy-related sales is more suggestive of a true forced-
sale e⁄ect. The largest coe¢ cient is for a sale that occurs within one year after a
bankruptcy ￿ling, and this coe¢ cient, at -0.053, is more than twice as large as those
estimated for the relatively infrequent sales that occur before bankruptcy.
In the case of foreclosures (not shown in the ￿gure) the timing pattern is U-shaped.
The coe¢ cient is -0.315 for foreclosure-related sales within one year of foreclosure,
-0.452 for sales 1 to 2 years after foreclosure, and -0.472 for sales 2 to 3 years after
foreclosure. In the case of sales more than 3 years after foreclosure, the coe¢ cient
is -0.216. Since more than 80% of foreclosure-related sales occur within a year of
foreclosure, the deeper price discounts for the relatively small number of sales that
occur with a delay of a year or more may re￿ ect di¢ cult market conditions that
reduce the ability of a lender to dispose of a foreclosed property in a timely manner.
The right hand columns of Table 6 show how forced-sale discounts vary with hous-
ing type. Overall and foreclosure-related discounts are larger for condominiums and
multi-family houses, and smaller for single-family houses. However, death-related
discounts are largest for single-family houses, smaller for multi-family houses, and
very small for condominiums. Since a large part of the maintenance of condomini-
ums is handled collectively through the condominium association, and tenants in
multi-family housing enforce minimum maintenance standards, this pattern is also
consistent with the view that death-related discounts are related to poor home main-
tenance by older sellers.
12To the extent that a forced sale discount re￿ ects poor maintenance of a house,
then it should be larger when the structure accounts for a greater share of the value
of a property, and smaller when the land and its associated building rights account
for a greater share of value. In the extreme case where a small house is sold in an
expensive neighborhood as a ￿tear-down￿ , there should be no maintenance-related
discount at all. Thus we can measure the importance of the maintenance e⁄ect by
looking at variation in the forced sale discount across houses with di⁄erent hedonic
characteristics.
In order to do this in a parsimonious manner, we follow a two-stage procedure.
In the ￿rst stage, we run the static hedonic regression of Table 5, omitting forced-sale
indicators. We decompose the predicted log price of each house into components
explained by the characteristics of the building, the size of the lot, the characteristics
of the census tract, and the zipcode-year interaction. In the second stage, reported
in Table 8, we regress the log price of each house on the levels of these components,
forced-sale indicators, and interactions between each of the forced-sale indicators and
each of the value components standardized to have zero mean and unit standard
deviation.
The coe¢ cients on forced-sale indicators in Table 8 are very similar to those re-
ported earlier in Table 6. However there are some interesting interaction e⁄ects
which imply larger or smaller discounts for forced sales of houses with atypical char-
acteristics. For death-related sales the price discounts for all housing types, and for
single-family houses, are larger when the building has greater value, consistent with
the idea that older sellers maintain their houses poorly. For bankruptcy-related sales,
the price discount is almost invariant to the value of the building, but is larger for
houses in expensive zipcodes and census tracts. For foreclosures, the price discount
is larger when the building is less valuable, and is also larger for houses in low-priced
zipcodes and census tracts.
These results suggest the following interpretation of forced-sales discounts. Death-
related discounts appear to result primarily from poor maintenance of single-family
houses by older sellers, since the discounts are increasing in seller age, insensitive to
the timing of sales in relation to death, large for single-family houses and very small
for collectively maintained condominiums, and greater for houses with more valuable
structures.
Bankruptcy-related discounts are consistent with a true liquidity e⁄ect. Bankrupt
sellers aim to reduce their housing costs after bankruptcy, and the urgency of doing
13this is greater for houses in expensive neighborhoods and zipcodes because these
houses have higher implicit rental costs. Bankruptcy-related discounts are higher for
such houses, and higher when a house is sold the year after bankruptcy, but relatively
insensitive to housing type.
Foreclosure-related discounts appear to be related both to the urgency of sale, and
to vandalism. Foreclosed houses may have been vandalized during the transfer of
ownership to mortgage lenders; and lenders sell urgently both because empty houses
deliver no housing services, and because it is expensive to protect such houses against
vandalism. Foreclosure-related discounts are larger in low-priced neighborhoods and
zipcodes, and larger for cheaper houses. This pattern may re￿ ect a greater threat
of vandalism in bad neighborhoods, and ￿xed costs of protection that justify larger
proportional discounts on cheaper houses.
3.3 Persistence of the forced sale discount
We have estimated signi￿cant e⁄ects of forced sales on house prices. An interesting
question is to what extent these e⁄ects persist. If the same house is sold again after
a forced sale, does it continue to have a lower price or does its price return to the
level predicted by the hedonic regression? In Table 9 we re-estimate our hedonic
regressions including information on the price at which each house was previously
sold. We ￿rst identify the date of the most recent previous sale of each house in our
transactions dataset, the price of that previous sale, and whether the previous sale
was forced. We create dummy variables for previous sales that took place within the
year before the current sale, one to three years before the current sale, three to ￿ve
years before the current sale, and ￿ve years or more before the current sale. Then we
interact the previous sales price, and dummies indicating whether the previous sale
was forced, with these dummies for the timing of the previous sale.
Table 9 shows that previous sales prices do have a persistent e⁄ect, which seems
almost invariant to the length of time since the last sale. The coe¢ cient on the
previous sales price of about 0.15 implies that a 10% lower price at the time of the
last sale, unexplained by the other variables in the hedonic regression, is associated
with a 1.4% lower price at the time of the current sale. This persistent price e⁄ect,
which is exploited by repeat-sales house price indexes (Case and Shiller 1987, 1989),
could re￿ ect unmeasured quality di⁄erentials across houses or the use of previous
prices as reference prices in bargaining by sellers and buyers.
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sales have large dynamic e⁄ects. Perhaps the most interesting result is that if the
previous sale was death-related, there is a modest positive e⁄ect on the subsequent
sales price that roughly o⁄sets the persistent negative e⁄ect of the death-related com-
ponent of the previous sales price (0.15 times the death-related discount). Thus, if
lack of maintenance is partly responsible for the measured death-related price dis-
count, it appears to be recti￿ed by the next owner of the property. However, one
must be cautious about this conclusion given the large standard errors on the esti-
mated e⁄ects. The coe¢ cients for bankruptcy-related and foreclosure-related sales
do not show any strong or consistent patterns.
4 Forced Sales and Neighborhood House Prices
4.1 Zipcode-level price dynamics
In this section we ask how the incidence and prices of forced sales relate to the prices
of unforced sales. We begin by aggregating house prices to the zipcode-year level and
examining the dynamics of zipcode-level house prices. In each zipcode in each year,
we weight each transaction equally and calculate the average price of forced sales, the
average price of unforced sales, and the share of forced sales. The appendix reports
summary statistics for this dataset. Unsurprisingly, we again ￿nd that forced sales
take place at lower prices. The distribution of the forced-sales share is extremely
right-skewed, with a median of only 4% but a 99th percentile of 34%. We winsorize
the fraction of forced sales at this level.
Table 10 presents regressions that describe the dynamics of house prices at the
zipcode level. To eliminate zipcode ￿xed e⁄ects, we di⁄erence the levels of log prices
to obtain house price growth rates in each zipcode. We also cross-sectionally demean
the data to control for the general evolution of house prices in Massachusetts.
Our ￿rst regression does not distinguish between forced and unforced sales prices.
When price growth is regressed on lagged price growth, we obtain a negative coe¢ -
cient of about ￿0:44, indicating that zipcode-level price variation is mean-reverting.
This result contrasts with the price momentum, or positive serial correlation of price
changes, observed in citywide, statewide, or national house price indexes (Case and
15Shiller, 1989). However, the explanatory power of this regression is modest, about
20%.
Next we separate log forced and unforced sales prices, and estimate an error-
correction model for the two of them. More speci￿cally, we estimate a ￿rst-order
vector autoregression (VAR) for the change in log forced sales prices and the level
of the forced sales discount, that is, the di⁄erence between log unforced and forced
sales prices. This procedure is appropriate if the forced sales discount is stationary,
so that log forced and unforced sales prices are cointegrated (Campbell and Shiller
1987, Engle and Granger 1987). The estimated VAR implies time-series behavior for
the omitted variable, in this case the log unforced sales price.6
We ￿nd a strong tendency for reversal in forced sales price growth. Lagged forced
price changes predict forced price changes with a coe¢ cient of ￿0:08. In addition,
a large discount of forced sales prices from unforced prices predicts that forced sales
prices will increase. These two e⁄ects together explain about 46% of the variation
in forced sales price growth. The forced sales discount is mean-reverting, with a
coe¢ cient of 0:07 on its own lag. The discount also has a coe¢ cient of 0:05 on
lagged forced sales price growth, implying that the discount is more likely to narrow
if it reached its previous level through a recent decline in forced sales prices; this is
another manifestation of reversal in forced sales price growth. The equations for
these two variables imply only very modest predictability for unforced sales prices,
with negative coe¢ cients of ￿0:03 on lagged forced sales prices and ￿0:09 on the
lagged discount, and an R2 statistic of 9%.
These VAR results imply that both forced and unforced sales prices move in such
a way as to narrow unusually large forced sales discounts. However, the explanatory
power of the regression is much greater for forced sales prices, at 46%, than for
unforced sales prices, at 9%. Zipcode averages of unforced sales prices appear to be
much closer to a random walk than are zipcode averages of forced sales prices. This
result supports the view that on average within each zipcode, unforced sales take
place at approximately e¢ cient prices, while forced sale prices are mean-reverting
because they re￿ ect time-varying illiquidity in zipcode-level housing markets.
The variation over time in the incidence of forced sales allows us to ask whether
6If enough lags are included in the system, the implied dynamics are the same whether one omits
the unforced or the forced sales price. We obtain broadly consistent results if we estimate a VAR
for the change in log unforced sales prices and the level of the forced sales discount, including either
one or two lags.
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of Table 11, we add the share of forced sales as a variable in the VAR system. We
￿nd that the forced sales share is highly persistent, with a coe¢ cient of 0:52 on its
own lag, and that it depresses forced sales price growth (with a coe¢ cient of ￿0:63)
and widens the forced sales discount (with a coe¢ cient of 0:61). Once again, this
VAR implies very little predictability in the growth rate of unforced sales prices.
Finally, we consider the possibility that a high share of forced sales a⁄ects the
dynamics of forced sales prices not only by directly predicting price changes, but by
altering the coe¢ cients on the other variables of the VAR system. In the second
panel of Table 11, we regress the forced sales share, the change in the log forced
sales price, and the forced sales discount on their own lags and the interaction of the
lagged forced sales share with the other two explanatory variables. We ￿nd that a
high forced sales share reduces the tendency for forced sales price growth to reverse,
and reduces the response of forced sales price growth to the forced sales discount.
Consistent with this, a high forced sales share increases the persistence of the forced
sales discount. The autoregressive coe¢ cient for the forced sales discount increases
from 0.07, in an environment with an average 5% share of forced sales, to 0.37, in
an environment with a share of forced sales at the 34% winsorization point. In
other words, a location with a high share of forced sales is likely to have persistently
depressed forced sales prices and high forced sales discounts.
In all these speci￿cations, we continue to ￿nd that unforced sales price growth is
hard to predict. The R2 statistic for unforced sales price growth is never more than
14% in models with single lags, and even if we add one more lag of each variable
the R2 statistic never exceeds 20%. The limited predictability of zipcode-level house
price movements, when sales are unforced, is a robust result across all the models we
estimate.
4.2 Local e⁄ects of foreclosures
Even though forced sales do not seem to drive large predictable movements in average
unforced sales prices within the same zipcode, it is possible that there are more local
e⁄ects of forced sales on neighboring houses that do not show up in data aggregated to
the zipcode level. A particular concern is that houses vacated during the foreclosure
process drive down neighborhood house prices. In this section we use data on the
precise location of each house transaction in our dataset to try to identify such e⁄ects.
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number of foreclosures, de￿ned as cases in which ownership of neighboring houses has
been transferred to mortgage lenders, causing them to enter an urgent sales process.
We ￿nd considerable evidence that foreclosures within 0.25 mile, and particularly
within 0.1 mile, lower the price at which a house can be sold.
A challenge in interpreting this result is that local economic shocks, such as plant
closings, may drive both house prices and foreclosures. Furthermore, foreclosures are
endogenous to house prices because homeowners are more likely to default if they have
negative equity, which is more likely as house prices fall. Ideally, we would like an
instrument that in￿ uences foreclosures but that does not in￿ uence house prices except
through foreclosures; however, we have not been able to ￿nd such an instrument.
Instead, we compare the e⁄ects of foreclosures before and after each transaction, and
the e⁄ects of extremely close foreclosures (under 0.1 mile from the target house) with
those that occur further away within the 0.25 mile radius.
Leigh and Rocko⁄ (2008) use such a comparison to identify the e⁄ect of sex of-
fenders on house prices. They perform a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence analysis, comparing
house prices before and after a sex o⁄ender moves into a neighborhood, and house
prices closer to the sex o⁄ender￿ s address with those further away. The di⁄erence
between house price growth in the sex o⁄ender￿ s immediate neighborhood and house
price growth in the sex o⁄ender￿ s broader neighborhood is an estimate of the e⁄ect
of the sex o⁄ender￿ s arrival on house prices. We have imitated Leigh and Rocko⁄￿ s
methodology, treating foreclosures as negative events analogous to sex o⁄ender ar-
rivals, and averaging the residuals from hedonic house-price regressions during the
year before and after each foreclosure, and within an inner circle of radius 0.1 mile
and an outer ring obtained by removing the inner circle from an outer circle of radius
0.25 mile. When we do this, we obtain a di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate that a
foreclosure lowers the price of neighboring houses by about 1%.
A limitation of the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence approach is that it does not readily
handle the fact that foreclosures are clustered, so many houses are close neighbors
of multiple foreclosures. (This is a much less serious problem in the case of sex
o⁄enders.) In the presence of clustering, the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate will
misstate the e⁄ect of each foreclosure, since low house prices caused by multiple
foreclosures are attributed to each one independently; clustering also complicates the
calculation of standard errors. For this reason, we return to our hedonic regression,
in which the sales price of a house is the dependent variable, and include measures of
18nearby foreclosures as explanatory variables.
Table 12 reports the results. All the previous hedonic variables are included in
the regressions of this table, but with the exception of the dummies for foreclosure-
related sales, they are not reported. In the ￿rst column, we add the number of
foreclosures that have occurred within 0.25 mile of each house during the year before
its date of sale. Because the distribution of foreclosures is extremely right-skewed,
we winsorize it at the 99th percentile (10 foreclosures) so that a few outliers do
not dominate the results. We are, however, particularly interested in the e⁄ects of
foreclosure waves on house prices, so we include dummy variables for cases where the
number of foreclosures within 0.25 mile lies between the 99th and 99.5th percentile
(10-15 foreclosures), between the 99.5th and 99.9th percentile (15-28 foreclosures),
and above the 99.9th percentile up to the sample maximum (28-73 foreclosures).
Because 82% of our transactions have no foreclosures within 0.25 mile during the
year before sale, these tail dummies capture a meaningful fraction of the cases with
foreclosures. For example, 0.01/0.18 or 5.6% of transactions with foreclosures nearby
are above the 99th percentile of the foreclosure distribution.
We also include an indicator of extremely close foreclosures, a weighted sum of
foreclosures within 0.1 mile of the target house, where the weight is 0.1 less the
distance to the foreclosure in miles, divided by 0.1. This indicator gives a weight
of 1 to a foreclosure at the same location (which can occur in a condo complex), a
weight of 0.5 to a foreclosure 0.05 miles or 88 yards away, and a weight of zero to a
foreclosure 0.1 miles or 176 yards away. It is also winsorized at the 99th percentile
(1.49), and we include dummies for extreme cases (1.49-2.42, 2.42-7.83, and 7.83-
50.95). 92% of our transactions have no foreclosures within 0.1 mile during the year
before sale, so as before, the tail dummies include a meaningful fraction of the cases
with extremely close foreclosures. We include this variable because it is plausible
that spillover e⁄ects of foreclosures on crime and the social cohesion of neighborhoods
are extremely local, more so than common economic shocks that might drive both
foreclosures and house prices.
In the second column, we control for average prices of unforced sales within the
0.25 mile radius during the previous year. We calculate a weighted average of log
prices (a geometric average price), using a linear weighting scheme that gives a weight
of 0.25 less the distance to the house in miles, divided by 0.25. By contrast with
the local foreclosure indicator, this is a weighted average, not a weighted sum, so it
divides by the sum of the weights. We set the variable to zero in cases where no
19unforced transaction has occurred within 0.25 miles during the previous year, and
include a dummy for these cases.
The third and fourth columns repeat the ￿rst two columns, adding foreclosure
variables and average neighborhood house prices during the year after each transac-
tion. If unobserved local shocks drive both prices and foreclosures, or if foreclosures
react to prices with a lag, we would expect that future foreclosures would have at
least as much explanatory power for house prices as lagged foreclosures.
The results of Table 12 imply that recent neighborhood foreclosures are highly
relevant for predicting the price at which a house will sell. Each foreclosure within
a 0.25 mile radius of a given house lowers the predicted log price by 1.8% in column
1, or 1.1% in column 2 when we control for the average level of recent unforced sales
prices in the neighborhood. Foreclosures within a 0.1 mile radius are even stronger
predictors, lowering the log price of a house by 9.1% if the foreclosure is at zero
distance, or 7.3% when we control for recent unforced sales prices, numbers close to
those claimed recently by the Obama Administration (US Treasury 2009). For both
variables, but particularly the local foreclosure indicator, we ￿nd extremely powerful
e⁄ects in the right tail of the distribution. A house in the top 0.1% of the distribution
for both variables has a price forecast that is lower by almost 50% in column 1, or
40% in column 2.
Of course, these estimates are not structural because they do not control for
unobserved common shocks that drive both foreclosures and house prices, or for
reverse causality from house prices to foreclosures. To move closer to structural
estimates of foreclosure e⁄ects, in columns 3 and 4 of Table 12 we add foreclosures that
take place in the year after a house is sold. The linear variables enter the regression
with negative signs, but with smaller coe¢ cients than on the corresponding lagged
variables. The tail dummies enter the regression with signs that are almost always
positive. Including future foreclosures reduces the coe¢ cients on lagged foreclosures
only modestly.
Within this framework, the equivalent of Leigh and Rocko⁄￿ s di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence
approach is to take the di⁄erence between the coe¢ cients on lagged and led distance-
weighted foreclosures within 0.1 mile. This procedure delivers an estimate that each
nearby foreclosure lowers the price of a house by about 2% if it takes place at zero
distance, and 1% if it takes place at a distance of 0.05 miles. This estimate is close
to that we obtained using the Leigh-Rocko⁄ approach.
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As a rough calculation, we have studied the foreclosures that took place during the
￿rst quarter of 2008. If we use the forecasting model in column 2 of Table 12, the
typical foreclosure during this period lowered the price of the foreclosed house by
$46,000 and the prices of all neighboring houses by a total of $406,000, for a total
loss in housing value of $452,000. If we use the di⁄erence-in-di⁄erence estimate
from column 4 of Table 12, the typical foreclosure in 2008:1 lowered the price of
the foreclosed house by $43,000 and the prices of neighboring houses by a total of
$110,000, for a total loss of $153,000. Even this considerably smaller estimate implies
that foreclosures have important negative e⁄ects on the prices of nearby houses.
To gain insight about the economic mechanism by which foreclosures lower the
value of nearby houses, in Table 13 we explore how spillover e⁄ects vary with housing
type and with the components of housing value. To save space, we use only the ￿nal
speci￿cation of Table 12, column 4, and report only the di⁄erence between the before
and after coe¢ cients on distant foreclosures, close foreclosures, and dummies for the
99th percentile of the distant and close foreclosure distribution.
There are several interesting results in Table 13. First, foreclosure spillover e⁄ects
are largest for single-family houses and condominiums, and absent for multi-family
houses. This may re￿ ect the fact that single-family housing is most vulnerable to
neighborhood crime and vandalism, while condominiums are collectively maintained
so foreclosures in a condominium complex adversely a⁄ect the maintenance budget
for all other units in the complex. Second, like the foreclosure discounts themselves,
spillovers tend to be larger for less valuable houses in less expensive zipcodes, once
again suggesting the importance of crime and vandalism.
Another important question about spillover e⁄ects is how long they last. In Table
14 we show that lagged foreclosures are good predictors of neighborhood house prices.
Column 1 of Table 14 repeats column 1 of Table 12, showing only the foreclosure
coe¢ cients to save space. Column 2 lags all foreclosures by a year, with little e⁄ect
on the estimated coe¢ cients. Column 3 includes both foreclosures during the most
recent year and foreclosures from the previous year; both sets of foreclosures enter
signi￿cantly with comparable coe¢ cients. Column 4 adds average neighborhood
house prices, as in column 2 of Table 12, with little e⁄ect on the coe¢ cients of
lagged foreclosures. While these estimates do not control for future foreclosures,
their persistence suggests that foreclosures do not merely cause transitory liquidity
discounts on the prices of neighboring houses, but may have negative physical e⁄ects
21on neighborhoods which last for some time. If this is the case, it adds credibility
to the concern that foreclosures reduce the ability of neighbors to re￿nance their
mortgages, and may even drive down neighbors￿home equity to the point at which
they also have incentives to default.
Several other results about spillovers are reported in the appendix to this paper.
We have distinguished between foreclosed houses which are already sold by the time
a neighboring house is sold, and those which are still on the market. There is little
di⁄erence between the estimated spillovers of these two types of houses. Also, we
have asked whether neighborhood foreclosures a⁄ect the discount at which foreclosure-
related sales take place. We ￿nd that foreclosures within 0.25 mile of a house tend
to increase the discount at which a foreclosed house is sold relative to comparable
unforced sales, but foreclosures within 0.1 mile tend to reduce that discount.
Our results cannot prove causality from foreclosures to house prices, but the com-
bination of timing e⁄ects (stronger from lagged foreclosures than from future fore-
closures) and geographical e⁄ects (stronger at extremely short distances) suggests
that there is reason to be concerned about spillovers from foreclosures to neighboring
houses despite the reassuring zipcode-level results reported in the previous subsec-
tion. The persistence of the spillovers we estimate, and their greater magnitude
in low-priced neighborhoods, suggest that like foreclosure discounts themselves, they
may be related to physical damage caused by the foreclosure process.
5 Conclusion
This paper uses data on almost 1.8 million house transactions in Massachusetts to
show that houses sold after foreclosure, or close in time to the death or bankruptcy
of at least one seller, are sold at lower prices than other houses. The discount is
particularly large for foreclosures, 28% of a house￿ s value on average. It is smaller for
death-related sales at 5-7% of value, and smaller again for bankruptcy-related sales
at 3% of value.
The pricing pattern for death-related sales suggests that the discount may be due
to poor maintenance, because it does not depend sensitively on the timing of the sale
relative to the timing of a seller￿ s death, is larger for deaths of older sellers, and is
larger for houses where the structure accounts for a greater fraction of the value of
22the property. The pricing pattern for foreclosures is quite di⁄erent. Foreclosure
discounts are larger for low-priced properties in low-priced zipcodes, which suggests
that foreclosing mortgage lenders face ￿xed costs of homeownership, probably related
to vandalism, that induce them to accept absolute discounts that are proportionally
larger for low-priced houses.
After aggregating to the zipcode-year level and controlling for movements in the
overall level of Massachusetts house prices, we ￿nd that the prices of unforced trans-
actions are close to a random walk, while forced sales take place at a substantial and
time-varying discount. This discount is larger and more persistent when the share
of forced sales is higher. These patterns suggest that most unforced transactions
in residential real estate take place at e¢ cient prices, at least relative to the general
level of house prices in Massachusetts. Forced sales take place at lower prices, which
one might think of as revealing a ￿bid price￿for houses as in the ￿nance literature
on the bid-ask spread in dealer markets (e.g. Roll 1984). When many homeowners
are selling urgently, the implied bid-ask spread widens for housing.
We also look for evidence that forced sales have spillover e⁄ects on the prices of
local unforced sales. This question is of particular interest given the increase in
the foreclosure rate in the current housing downturn (Gerardi, Shapiro, and Willen
2007, Calomiris, Longhofer, and Miles 2008). We ￿nd that foreclosures predict lower
prices for houses located less than 0.25 mile, and particularly less than 0.1 mile
away. Although foreclosures and prices are both endogenous variables, the fact
that foreclosures lead prices at such short distances does reinforce the concern that
foreclosures have negative external e⁄ects in the housing market. Our preferred
estimate of the spillover e⁄ect suggests that each foreclosure that takes place 0.05
miles away lowers the price of a house by about 1%.
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26Min Max Mean Stdev 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Panel I: Housing characteristics
Price ($1000) 6.80 1,820.00 225.40 169.18 23.50 117.00 175.80 289.90 860.00
Total rooms 2 16 6.79 2.56 3 5 6 8 16
Full bathrooms 0 4 1.64 0.71 1 1 2 2 4
Half bathrooms 0 2 0.44 0.53 0 0 0 1 2
Bedrooms 1 9 3.15 1.31 1 2 3 4 8
Lotsize 0 261,360 20,781 36,493 0 2,875 9,452 22,005 229,997
Interior Square Feet 509 4,627 1,725 823 509 1,122 1,535 2,145 4,404
House age 0 356 48.28 42.33 0 14 38 78 184
Panel II: Neighborhood characteristics
Median Income 2,499 200,001 58,945 23,376 16,861 43,385 55,521 70,250 131,823
% Hispanic 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.09 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.04 0.50
% Black 0.00 0.95 0.04 0.10 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.03 0.59
% 0-17 years old 0.00 0.49 0.23 0.07 0.04 0.20 0.24 0.28 0.37
% 65+ years old 0.00 0.71 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.39
% Female-headed HH 0.00 0.48 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.26
% with Bachelor’s degree 0.00 0.73 0.21 0.10 0.02 0.13 0.20 0.28 0.45
% with graduate degree 0.00 0.72 0.15 0.12 0.00 0.06 0.11 0.20 0.52
% with less than high school degree 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.11 0.00 0.06 0.10 0.17 0.50
 
Notes: dataset is an extract of the residential real estate changes of ownership file from the Warren Group for Massachusetts. The details for creating the
extract are contained in the data appendix. Panel I reports values per sale, while Panel II reports 2000 census data at the tract level for each sale.
Table 1 - Descriptive statisticsYear Total Obs Deaths Bankruptcies Foreclosures Total Forced
1987 89,596 1.0% 0.0% 0.0% 1.0%
1988 79,684 0.9% 0.0% 0.1% 0.9%
1989 66,762 0.9% 0.0% 0.3% 1.2%
1990 54,635 0.9% 0.0% 1.2% 2.1%
1991 57,571 1.1% 0.1% 5.3% 6.4%
1992 68,878 1.2% 0.2% 8.3% 9.8%
1993 74,756 1.6% 0.3% 9.7% 11.6%
1994 81,205 1.8% 0.5% 8.4% 10.7%
1995 76,104 1.8% 0.6% 7.1% 9.4%
1996 84,319 1.6% 0.7% 5.0% 7.3%
1997 90,403 1.8% 0.8% 4.3% 6.9%
1998 99,945 1.9% 0.9% 3.0% 5.7%
1999 103,375 1.8% 1.1% 2.2% 5.2%
2000 95,452 1.9% 1.1% 1.8% 4.8%
2001 89,956 2.0% 1.1% 1.4% 4.5%
2002 92,989 2.2% 1.2% 1.2% 4.6%
2003 94,987 2.3% 1.4% 0.7% 4.5%
2004 106,077 2.5% 1.4% 0.7% 4.5%
2005 102,492 2.1% 1.3% 0.8% 4.2%
2006 86,924 1.8% 1.2% 1.6% 4.5%
2007 78,001 1.6% 0.9% 5.2% 7.7%
2008 9,249 1.0% 0.8% 12.7% 14.5%
Total 1,783,360 1.7% 0.8% 3.1% 5.6%
Group Death Bankruptcy Foreclosure
sale 3 yrs before event 0.21% 0.08%
sale 2 yrs before event 0.26% 0.08%
sale 1 yr before event 0.35% 0.07%
sale 1 yr after event 0.50% 0.24% 2.64%
sale 2 yrs after event 0.26% 0.17% 0.29%
sale 3 yrs after event 0.13% 0.13% 0.06%
Notes: data on deaths from the Social Security Death Master file and data on bankruptcies obtained from the
MA Bankruptcy Court. Panel A reports the percentage of observations that are classified as deaths,
bankruptcies, or foreclosures each year. An observation is assigned to one of the mutually exclusive categories
according to the rules described in Appendix A. For deaths and bankruptcies, a sale is considered forced if the
sale happens within 3 years before or after the sale. For foreclosures, a sale is considered forced whenever
the sale occurs after the auction (or at the auction itself if successful). For each type of forced sale, Panel B
reports how the forced sales as a percentage of total observations are distributed before and after the event
which forces the sale. Our main housing dataset includes sales up to March 2008.
Panel A: Forced transactions by year
Panel B: Timing of forced transactions
Table 2 - Frequency of forced sales% of total obs Single family Multifamily Condo % Boston Death Bankruptcy
All observations 100.0% 64.4% 11.1% 24.5% 8.1%
Unforced 94.4% 64.6% 10.5% 24.9% 8.0%
Forced 5.6% 62.2% 19.7% 18.0% 9.7%
      Death 1.7% 76.6% 14.5% 9.0% 5.3% 0.7%
      Bankruptcy 0.8% 71.3% 15.3% 13.4% 5.5% 1.1%
      Foreclosure 3.1% 52.1% 23.7% 24.2% 13.2% 0.5% 3.1%
Notes: the first column reports the fraction of observations identified as forced, following the matching process described in the data appendix. The
next three columns report the property type composition, while the fifth column reports the fraction of observations in Boston. The last two columns
report, for each category, how many matches were also matched as another type of forced sale before applying the rules we use to classify the
transaction in these cases.
% of each type also: Property type (% of firesale type)
Table 3 - Other characteristics of forced salesMin Max Mean Stdev 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Panel A.I: Housing characteristics
Price ($1000) 7.15 1,675.00 151.46 126.82 13.50 68.00 116.00 197.00 600.00
Total rooms 2 16 7.18 3.06 3 5 6 8 16
Full bathrooms 0 4 1.60 0.73 1 1 1 2 4
Half bathrooms 0 2 0.34 0.50 0 0 0 1 2
Bedrooms 1 9 3.37 1.57 1 2 3 4 9
Lotsize 0 261,360 16,524 31,105 0 3,825 7,508 16,117 185,086
Interior Square Feet 509 4,627 1,713 850 509 1,090 1,480 2,128 4,374
House age 0 341 58.97 40.38 0 53 91 106 341
Panel A.II: Neighborhood characteristics
Median Income 7,271 200,001 50,613 19,766 15,268 37,143 48,269 61,047 115,456
% Hispanic 0.00 0.96 0.07 0.12 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.08 0.59
% Black 0.00 0.95 0.07 0.15 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.05 0.83
% 0-17 years old 0.00 0.49 0.24 0.07 0.05 0.21 0.24 0.28 0.40
% 65+ years old 0.00 0.71 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.09 0.13 0.17 0.37
% Female-headed HH 0.00 0.48 0.08 0.06 0.01 0.04 0.06 0.09 0.29
% with Bachelor’s degree 0.00 0.73 0.17 0.10 0.01 0.10 0.15 0.23 0.43
% with graduate degree 0.00 0.72 0.10 0.09 0.00 0.04 0.08 0.14 0.44
% with less than high school degree 0.00 0.83 0.17 0.12 0.01 0.08 0.14 0.24 0.55
Min Max Mean Stdev 1% 25% 50% 75% 99%
Panel B.I: Ratio of housing characteristics of 
forced sales to all sales
Price ($1000) 1.05 0.92 0.67 0.75 0.57 0.58 0.66 0.68 0.70
Total rooms 1.00 1.00 1.06 1.19 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
Full bathrooms - 1.00 0.98 1.04 1.00 1.00 0.50 1.00 1.00
Half bathrooms - 1.00 0.76 0.95 - - - 1.00 1.00
Bedrooms 1.00 1.00 1.07 1.20 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.13
Lotsize - 1.00 0.80 0.85 - 1.33 0.79 0.73 0.80
Interior Square Feet 1.00 1.00 0.99 1.03 1.00 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99
House age - 0.96 1.22 0.95 - 3.79 2.39 1.36 1.85
Panel B.II: Ratio of neighborhood 
characteristics of forced sales to all sales
Median Income 2.91 1.00 0.86 0.85 0.91 0.86 0.87 0.87 0.88
% Hispanic - 0.96 1.50 1.26 1.07 1.15 1.37 1.94 1.20
% Black - 1.00 1.71 1.52 - 1.32 1.43 1.72 1.41
% 0-17 years old - 1.00 1.04 0.95 1.15 1.06 1.01 1.01 1.06
% 65+ years old - 1.00 0.99 0.98 1.04 0.99 0.99 1.00 0.96
% Female-headed HH - 1.00 1.33 1.31 1.54 1.19 1.27 1.40 1.12
% with Bachelor’s degree - 1.00 0.81 0.96 0.53 0.74 0.76 0.82 0.94
% with graduate degree - 1.00 0.71 0.78 - 0.68 0.68 0.69 0.84
% with less than high school degree - 0.83 1.33 1.17 - 1.40 1.42 1.37 1.10
Notes: sample is subset of transactions which are deaths and bankruptcies within 3 year from the sale, plus foreclosures.  Panel A is analogous to Table 1.  
Panel B reports the ratio of values in Panel A with the corresponding values in Table 1. Whenever the value in Table 1 is 0, we do not report the number, as 
the ratio cannot be computed.
Panel A: Characteristics of forced sales
Panel B: Ratio of characteristics of forced sales to all sales
Table 4 - Descriptive statistics for forced salesVariable Estimate Standard Error
Lot size (x10,000) 0.001 (0.000)
Bedrooms 0.023 (0.000)
Total number of rooms 0.013 (0.000)
Full Bathrooms 0.098 (0.001)
Half Bathrooms 0.094 (0.001)
Interior Square Feet (x10,000) 0.764 (0.010)
House Age (x10) -0.016 (0.000)
House Age Squared 0.0005 (0.000)
Condominium -0.204 (0.002)
High number of Rooms Indicator -0.083 (0.004)
High number of Bedrooms Indicator -0.076 (0.004)
High number of Full Bathrooms Indicator -0.089 (0.003)
High number of Half Bathrooms Indicator -0.082 (0.003)
High square feet Indicator -0.027 (0.005)
Low square feet Indicator -0.225 (0.008)
Renovated in the last 10 years 0.056 (0.002)
Renovated 10 to 20 years before 0.010 (0.003)
Renovated 20 to 30 years before 0.007 (0.003)
Renovated more than 30 years before 0.005 (0.004)
% Hispanic -0.220 (0.008)
% Black -0.136 (0.008)
% Less than 17 years old -0.204 (0.011)
% More than 65 years old 0.386 (0.007)
% Female-headed household -0.066 (0.015)
Median Income 0.018 (0.000)
% Bachelor Degree 0.225 (0.006)
% Graduate Degree 0.346 (0.006)
% Less than High School Diploma -0.102 (0.007)
Number of Observations 1,783,360
R-squared 0.718
Notes: the table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of a regression of
log house price on house and census characteristics and forced sale indicators as in Table 6,
panel B. The regression includes zip code-year fixed effects.
Table 5 - Hedonic regression coefficientsEstimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
Forced (-3 years;+3 years)  -0.199 (0.001) -0.151 (0.002) -0.240 (0.003) -0.235 (0.003)
Number of Observations 1,783,360 1,149,215 197,124 437,021
R-squared 0.716 0.714 0.742 0.805
Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
Death, young seller (-3;+3) -0.051 (0.005) -0.063 (0.006) -0.028 (0.013) -0.008 (0.012)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) -0.068 (0.002) -0.081 (0.003) -0.058 (0.007) -0.010 (0.007)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  -0.032 (0.003) -0.040 (0.004) -0.018 (0.009) -0.030 (0.008)
Foreclosure -0.323 (0.002) -0.253 (0.002) -0.359 (0.004) -0.322 (0.003)
Number of Observations 1,783,360 1,149,215 197,124 437,021
R-squared 0.718 0.715 0.745 0.806
Multi Family Condominium
Full sample Single Family
Notes: table reports the coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of a regression of log house price on house and census characteristics and disaggregated forced sale
indicators, on the full sample, and separately for each house type. Coefficients on house and census characteristics for the full sample specification are reported in Table 5. Death,
bankruptcy and foreclosure indicators are mutually exclusive. Young seller is defined as a seller younger than 70 at the time of death. There are 5,311 cases of young deaths and 25,100
cases of old deaths. The regression includes zip code-year fixed effects.





Single FamilyEstimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
One seller
Death, young seller (-3;+3)  -0.082 (0.009) -0.087 (0.011) -0.062 (0.021) 0.009 (0.021)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) -0.095 (0.004) -0.103 (0.005) -0.092 (0.011) -0.021 (0.011)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  -0.061 (0.005) -0.072 (0.006) -0.014 (0.013) -0.054 (0.011)
Two sellers
Death, young seller (-3;+3)  -0.035 (0.006) -0.050 (0.007) -0.006 (0.017) -0.017 (0.015)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) -0.053 (0.003) -0.070 (0.003) -0.038 (0.008) -0.004 (0.009)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  -0.014 (0.004) -0.022 (0.005) -0.021 (0.012) -0.006 (0.011)
Full sample Single Family Multi Family Condominium
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of hedonic regression of log price with interactions of the forced sale variables with indicators for one and two
sellers.  42% of the full sample has two sellers. The regression includes the house and census characteristics of Table 5.
Table 7 - Number of sellers effectsEstimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
Levels of forced sale eﬀects
Death, young seller (-3;+3)  -0.052 (0.005) -0.065 (0.006) -0.026 (0.013) 0.001 (0.013)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) -0.069 (0.002) -0.089 (0.003) -0.059 (0.007) -0.009 (0.007)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  -0.040 (0.004) -0.044 (0.004) -0.023 (0.009) -0.037 (0.009)
Foreclosure -0.256 (0.002) -0.227 (0.003) -0.267 (0.005) -0.271 (0.005)
Forced sale eﬀects interacted with building component
Death, young seller (-3;+3)  -0.017 (0.006) -0.012 (0.007) 0.028 (0.014) 0.013 (0.014)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) -0.033 (0.003) -0.019 (0.003) 0.009 (0.007) -0.007 (0.008)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  0.002 (0.004) 0.005 (0.004) -0.002 (0.009) 0.000 (0.008)
Foreclosure 0.052 (0.002) 0.029 (0.003) -0.004 (0.004) 0.046 (0.003)
Forced sale eﬀects interacted with lotsize component
Death, young seller (-3;+3)  -0.003 (0.006) -0.009 (0.007) 0.004 (0.016) -0.008 (0.014)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) -0.004 (0.003) -0.024 (0.003) 0.017 (0.008) 0.007 (0.008)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  -0.001 (0.004) -0.004 (0.005) -0.004 (0.011) -0.005 (0.009)
Foreclosure -0.020 (0.002) 0.000 (0.003) -0.010 (0.005) -0.011 (0.003)
Forced sale eﬀects interacted with census component
Death, young seller (-3;+3)  0.001 (0.006) 0.004 (0.007) 0.008 (0.015) 0.016 (0.014)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) 0.006 (0.003) 0.010 (0.003) 0.017 (0.008) 0.014 (0.009)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  -0.025 (0.004) -0.017 (0.005) -0.033 (0.009) -0.018 (0.009)
Foreclosure 0.052 (0.002) 0.033 (0.002) 0.086 (0.004) -0.005 (0.003)
Forced sale eﬀects interacted with zipcode component
Death, young seller (-3;+3)  -0.012 (0.006) -0.008 (0.006) -0.009 (0.014) -0.046 (0.014)
Death, old seller (-3;+3) -0.004 (0.003) -0.001 (0.003) -0.008 (0.007) -0.020 (0.008)
Bankruptcy (-3;+3)  -0.015 (0.004) -0.015 (0.004) -0.013 (0.009) -0.003 (0.009)
Foreclosure 0.042 (0.002) -0.001 (0.003) 0.074 (0.004) 0.033 (0.003)
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of hedonic regression of log price with indicators of forced sales, plus the interactions with standardized
components of the value of the house. These components are obtained in a first stage regression of log price on the house and census characteristics of Table 5. The predicted
price is then decomposed into the components explained by the value of the building, the size of the lot, the census data and the zipcode-year interaction. The second-stage
regression regresses log price on the forced sales dummies interacted with the components described above, standardized to zero mean and unit variance. These components
also enter in levels (not shown).
Table 8 - Price discount and value components
Full sample Single Family Multi Family CondominiumVariable Estimate Standard Error
Less than a year 0.154 (0.001)
Between 1 and 3 years 0.155 (0.001)
Between 3 and 5 years 0.156 (0.001)
More than 5 years 0.156 (0.001)
Previous sale: young death
Sale within a year before 0.002 (0.023)
Sale within 1 and 3 years before 0.012 (0.018)
Sale within 3 and 5 years before 0.014 (0.019)
Sale more than 5 years before 0.023 (0.014)
Previous sale: old death
Sale within a year before 0.023 (0.011)
Sale within 1 and 3 years before 0.014 (0.008)
Sale within 3 and 5 years before 0.011 (0.009)
Sale more than 5 years before 0.045 (0.007)
Previous sale: bankruptcy
Sale within a year before -0.037 (0.012)
Sale within 1 and 3 years before -0.004 (0.010)
Sale within 3 and 5 years before 0.006 (0.012)
Sale more than 5 years before 0.022 (0.012)
Previous sale: foreclosure
Sale within a year before 0.011 (0.005)
Sale within 1 and 3 years before -0.028 (0.005)
Sale within 3 and 5 years before -0.018 (0.005)
Sale more than 5 years before 0.033 (0.004)
Previous price x time between sales
Table 9 - Previous Forced Sales Effect
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of hedonic regression of log price with
indicators of forced sales in the previous transaction, decomposed into different windows depending on the time
since the last transaction. The regression includes the house and census characteristics of Table 5, and the forced
sales indicators of the Table 6, Panel B.Δpt Δpft put-pft Δput
Δpft-1 -0.075 0.046 -0.029
(0.012) (0.012) (0.004)




Observations 9820 6801 6801 6801
R-squared 0.204 0.463 0.220 0.089
Table 10 - VAR for neighborhood house prices
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of VAR of percentage
change in average forced and unforced house prices at the zipcode-year level, cross-
sectionally demeaned. p is the average price of all sales, pf is the average price of forced sales
and pu is the average price of unforced sales in each zipcode at time t. Each specification
includes neighborhood fixed effects.sft Δpft put-pft Δput
sft-1 0.519 -0.628 0.609 -0.020
(0.012) (0.084) (0.083) (0.031)
Δpft-1 0.000 -0.068 0.040 -0.029
(0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
put-1-pft-1 0.009 0.850 0.061 -0.090
(0.002) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006)
Observations 6,801 6,801 6,801 6,801
R-squared 0.614 0.468 0.227 0.089
sft Δpft put-pft Δput
sft-1 0.496 -0.378 0.500 0.120
(0.012) (0.086) (0.086) (0.031)
Δpft-1 -0.002 -0.051 0.028 -0.023
(0.002) (0.012) (0.012) (0.004)
put-1-pft-1 0.011 0.831 0.072 -0.097
(0.002) (0.017) (0.017) (0.006)
sft-1 x Δpft-1 -0.052 -0.039 -0.460 -0.499
(0.031) (0.219) (0.218) (0.079)
sft-1 x (put-1-pft-1) 0.200 -2.432 0.884 -1.548
(0.035) (0.243) (0.242) (0.088)
Observations 6,801 6,801 6,801 6,801
R-squared 0.618 0.479 0.231 0.132
Panel A: VAR with lagged forced share
Panel B: VAR with lagged forced share interactions
Table 11 - Neighborhood VAR with share of forced sales
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors (in parenthesis) of VAR of percentage
change in average forced and unforced house prices at the zipcode-year level, cross-sectionally
demeaned. pf is the average price of forced sales, pu the average price of unforced sales, and sf 
the share of forced sales in each zipcode at time t. Each specification includes neighborhood
fixed effects.[1] [2] [3] [4]
Far, before -0.018 -0.011 -0.015 -0.006
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Far, after -0.006 -0.001
(0.000) (0.000)
Close, before -0.091 -0.073 -0.082 -0.059
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Close, after -0.062 -0.042
(0.002) (0.002)
Far 99.0, before 0.021 0.004 0.017 -0.007
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Far 99.0, after 0.049 0.014
(0.005) (0.005)
Far 99.5, before -0.025 -0.025 -0.030 -0.029
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
Far 99.5, after 0.060 0.024
(0.006) (0.006)
Far 99.9, before -0.109 -0.085 -0.117 -0.070
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.012)
Far 99.9, after 0.049 0.027
(0.012) (0.011)
Close 99.0, before -0.017 -0.016 -0.010 -0.009
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Close 99.0, after 0.006 0.002
(0.005) (0.005)
Close 99.5, before -0.120 -0.100 -0.092 -0.071
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
Close 99.5, after 0.004 0.007
(0.006) (0.005)
Close 99.9, before -0.258 -0.184 -0.210 -0.121
(0.011) (0.011) (0.012) (0.012)
Close 99.9, after -0.025 0.012
(0.012) (0.011)
Average price, before 0.270 0.191
(0.001) (0.001)
Average price, after 0.207
(0.001)
No transaction before 3.256 2.290
(0.012) (0.013)
No transaction after 2.520
(0.013)
Sale 1 yr after foreclosure -0.29 -0.283 -0.287 -0.278
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Sale 2 yrs after foreclosure -0.414 -0.405 -0.41 -0.396
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Sale 3 yrs after foreclosure -0.433 -0.419 -0.429 -0.406
(0.012) (0.012) (0.012) (0.011)
Sale more than 3 yrs -0.210 -0.186 -0.208 -0.177
after foreclosure (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Table 12 - Cross-price effects of foreclosures
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors, in parenthesis, of hedonic regression of log price on the unweighted number of foreclosures
in the 0.25mi area around the house sold winsorized at the 99th percentile (variable Far), and the linearly weighted number of foreclosures in the
0.1mi area, also winsorized at the 99th percentile (variable Close), for the year before and after the sale. We also add indicators for the 99th,
99.5th and 99.9th percentile of those variables. They are as follows. For Close, before: 1.59 (99%), 2.57 (99.5%) and 8 (99.9%). For Far, before:
10 (99%), 15 (99.5%) and 28 (99.9%). For Close, after: 1.54 (99%), 2.32 (99.5%) and 6.71 (99.9%). For Far, after: 10 (99%), 14 (99.5%) and 26
(99.9%). Finally, columns 2 and 4 add the distance-weighted average log price of neighboring houses (0.25mi), in the year before and after the
sale, and an indicator for the cases where there are no transactions in the neighborhood, for that time frame. The regression includes the house
and census characteristics in Table 5, and the foreclosure and bankruptcy indicators of Table 6, Panel B.Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err Estimate Std Err
Levels of spillover eﬀects
Far, before - after 0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001) -0.005 (0.002) 0.002 (0.001)
Close, before - after -0.009 (0.004) -0.012 (0.007) 0.016 (0.009) -0.009 (0.004)
Far 99.0, before - after 0.003 (0.011) -0.019 (0.029) 0.006 (0.021) -0.003 (0.011)
Close 99.0, before - after 0.012 (0.010) 0.040 (0.027) -0.013 (0.024) -0.025 (0.009)
Spillover eﬀects interacted with building component
Far, before - after 0.006 (0.001) 0.006 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001) -0.010 (0.001)
Close, before - after 0.012 (0.003) 0.014 (0.007) 0.003 (0.008) 0.035 (0.004)
Far 99.0, before - after 0.023 (0.007) -0.051 (0.018) 0.035 (0.014) 0.016 (0.008)
Close 99.0, before - after 0.025 (0.007) 0.024 (0.022) -0.006 (0.017) 0.011 (0.007)
Spillover eﬀects interacted with lotsize component
Far, before - after -0.002 (0.001) 0.002 (0.001) 0.001 (0.002) -0.001 (0.001)
Close, before - after -0.007 (0.003) -0.011 (0.007) -0.012 (0.010) 0.002 (0.004)
Far 99.0, before - after -0.033 (0.008) -0.044 (0.019) 0.000 (0.019) 0.001 (0.009)
Close 99.0, before - after 0.003 (0.006) 0.013 (0.002) -0.006 (0.022) -0.010 (0.007)
Spillover eﬀects interacted with census component
Far, before - after 0.008 (0.001) 0.005 (0.001) 0.007 (0.001) 0.006 (0.001)
Close, before - after -0.004 (0.003) -0.015 (0.005) 0.012 (0.008) -0.003 (0.004)
Far 99.0, before - after 0.020 (0.006) 0.019 (0.013) 0.028 (0.015) 0.030 (0.007)
Close 99.0, before - after 0.003 (0.006) 0.016 (0.014) 0.002 (0.018) -0.003 (0.006)
Spillover eﬀects interacted with zipcode component
Far, before - after -0.001 (0.001) -0.003 (0.001) -0.001 (0.001) 0.000 (0.001)
Close, before - after 0.011 (0.003) 0.011 (0.006) 0.012 (0.007) 0.009 (0.004)
Far 99.0, before - after 0.010 (0.006) -0.003 (0.014) -0.002 (0.012) 0.047 (0.008)
Close 99.0, before - after 0.013 (0.006) -0.016 (0.016) 0.006 (0.015) -0.003 (0.007)
Single Family Multi Family Condominium
Table 13 - Interaction of spillover effect with value components
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors of hedonic regression of log price on the the unweighted number of foreclosures in the 0.25mi area around the house sold winsorized at
the 99th percentile (variable Far), and the linearly weighted number of foreclosures in the 0.1mi area, also winsorized at the 99th percentile (variable Close), for the year before and after the
sale. We also add indicators for the 99th percentile of those variables: for Close, before: 1.59 (99%); for Far, before: 10 (99%); for Close, after: 1.54 (99%); for Far, after: 10 (99%). The
estimation proceeds in two stages, as in Table 8, by first decomposing the predicted price in four parts and then in a second stage interacting those with the neighborhood foreclosure
variables. The second stage regression includes (not shown) levels of the value components and neighborhood prices, before and after the sale.
Full sampleSpecification [1] of 
T12 Only lagged Adding lagged to 
[1] of T12
Adding lagged to 
[2] of T12
Far, before -0.019 -0.012 -0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Lagged far, before -0.020 -0.013 -0.007
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
Close, before -0.088 -0.073 -0.060
(0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Lagged Close, before -0.093 -0.081 -0.064
(0.002) -0.0020 (0.002)
Far 99.0 tail, before -0.022 0.001 -0.009
(0.004) (0.005) (0.004)
Lagged Far 99.0 tail, before -0.014 0.007 0.003
(0.004) (0.005) (0.005)
Close 99.0 tail, before -0.080 -0.041 -0.035
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Lagged Close 99.0 tail, before -0.087 -0.051 -0.042
(0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Table 14 - Lagged foreclosures
Notes: table reports coefficients and standard errors, in parenthesis, of hedonic regression of log price on the unweighted
number of foreclosures in the 0.25mi area around the house sold winsorized at the 99th percentile (variable Far), and the
linearly weighted number of foreclosures in the 0.1mi area, also winsorized at the 99th percentile (variable Close), for the
year before the sale. It also adds the same measures for the number of foreclosures occurred between one and two
years before the sale ("lagged" variables). The regression also includes a single dummy for the 99th percentile of the
distribution of those variables (reported in the note of table 12). The regression includes the house and census
characteristics in Table 5, and the foreclosure and bankruptcy indicators of Table 6, Panel B. 
 







Figure 2: Geographic Distribution of Percentage of Housing Transactions that are Forced Sales by Zip Code       
     
      
      
      
      
  














                                                               
            
          
           
                                                 